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Auditor Independence
By A. C. Littleton
The nineteenth century statutes by which the British sought 
to control joint-stock companies for the better protection of 
investors plainly show that Englishmen of that time had a very 
clear idea of the nature of a corporation and of the proper relation 
of directors to stockholders. The company was merely a mecha­
nism for drawing scattered capital together and putting it to work; 
the stockholders were investors who pooled their savings for a 
common objective; the directors were elected representatives 
(“stewards ”) of the stockholders and were charged with the direct 
responsibility of managing the investment for the investors’ 
benefit. But a knowledge of human nature and the existence of 
an historical background, which included the stock-jobbing 
period immediately preceding 1720, combined to lead the British 
to frame their corporation statutes in such a manner as to provide 
the stockholders with other representatives who were to “test the 
stewardship,” as it were, of the managing representatives. At 
first the critic was an auditing committee of stockholders, later 
an independent professional auditor.
The developments of the past few years in our own country 
have raised questions similar to those which must have agitated 
Englishmen several generations ago. Can elected directors and 
hired managers of corporations that are touched with a public 
interest, because of the extent of the company’s operations, the 
number of employees or investors or the character of the service 
rendered—can such men, chosen by one group of investors, be 
depended upon to manage the corporation with a balanced con­
sideration for the best interests of all concerned? Can a way be 
provided for independent third parties to review the acts and pro­
posals of the managing representatives in a critical manner and 
with the interests of both present and prospective investors in 
mind?
British and American experiences dictate a negative answer to 
the first question in enough cases to show that the problem of 
securing a responsible management is not a negligible one. The 
British precedent of the auditor-critic suggests an affirmative 
answer to the second problem and thereby raises the additional 
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question of whether the English plan of electing auditors in 
the stockholders’ meeting should be adopted in this country 
or some other plan should be devised to improve investor pro­
tection.
The first reply to the last question probably would be that Eng­
lishmen are not altogether satisfied with their own system. In 
spite of election of the auditor by the stockholders, we are led to 
believe that the goodwill of the directors is important, that the 
selection of the auditor practically always rests with the directors 
in the final analysis, that the courts have so circumscribed the 
auditors’ duties as to make the stockholders’ protection rather 
formal and that “until auditors are insured a much greater degree 
of independence than they at present possess, it is hardly to be 
expected that they can be an effective safeguard against waste of 
shareholders’ funds in company administration.’’ (See Financial 
Democracy, Miller and Campbell, chapter 4.)
The second reply to the question of transplanting the British 
system is that conditions peculiar to the United States would 
seem to make election of the auditor by the stockholders even less 
satisfactory here. Getting stockholders out to meetings is a 
problem everywhere, but the impression persists that it is par­
ticularly difficult in this country.
Most of our security holders act alike in spite of differences in 
the terms of their contracts: bondholders by agreement have no 
vote for directors and policies; stockholders neglect to exercise 
their prerogative and thus voluntarily place themselves in the 
same category as bondholders as far as management control is 
concerned. Stockholders do not seem to feel ownership responsi­
bilities ; and they are quite apt to look to the market for the clue 
to the value of their holdings rather than to financial statements. 
This has a tendency to make many directors more market-con­
scious than good management would dictate.
In addition to the other things, we have devised a very extended 
array of securities contracts with numerous and complex diversi­
ties. This vast expansion in the types of credit instruments has 
greatly diluted the sense of ownership. The situation is no 
longer one of the simple pooling of capital in a joint-stock by in­
dividual investors receiving very similar interests in the enter­
prise. The diversity of securities makes for diversity of interests; 
and diversity, abetted by complexity of the contract, opens the 
way to a possible subtle undermining of the prior rights of senior 
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securities by new issues. (See Berle and Means, The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property; also Graham and Dodd, Security 
Analysis.)
The situation therefore calls for an American plan to fit Ameri­
can conditions.
The only American plan so far developed aims at investor pro­
tection through the application of the provisions of the federal 
securities act and the securities exchange act, supplemented by 
regulations issued by the securities and exchange commission. 
It is not proposed here to discuss the probable success or failure of 
this method of attack upon the broad problem. The statutes 
have been charged with blocking the flow of private capital into 
industry, but recent regulations of the commission seem to prom­
ise relief for corporations with an established record. The very 
large budget proposed for the commission has raised the fear in 
some quarters of an extensive bureaucracy which may sometime 
attempt to regiment business into too much uniformity, but an­
ticipatory fears of this sort usually outrun eventual actualities. 
Yet it must be acknowledged that the British experience with de­
centralized administration of income-tax laws has been more 
satisfactory than ours has been with a high degree of centraliza­
tion, which would seem to be an argument against too great cen­
tralization of control over securities.
However, it is desirable to raise the question whether the possi­
bilities have been fully canvassed for investor protection by a more 
effective use of experienced public accountants. The work of our 
public accountants has now been given a statutory recognition 
it never had before. But that is only a tardy recognition of just 
a part of the service which they are competent to perform. Here 
is a body of men, estimated to be approximately 14,000 in number, 
who by education, experience and ideals of service are unusually 
well qualified to fulfill in America the spirit of the early British 
theory of the corporation auditor: an independent and expert 
critic, in the interest of all investors, of the stewardship of the 
directors.
Qualified to serve these men may be, but free to serve with a 
real independence they are not.
Public accounting is faced with certain weaknesses which are 
probably inherent in the present scheme of things.
1. Auditors are engaged by the officers or directors whose activi­
ties are to be examined.
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2. Auditors may be dropped and others substituted at the 
pleasure of the officers or directors; and the deposed auditor 
has no recourse even though he may suspect that attempts 
to mislead investors are contemplated.
3. Auditors have no power effectively to criticize directors’ 
valuations or financial proposals even though the equity of 
some prior stock is being weakened. When their powers of 
persuasion are exhausted, auditors have but little choice 
except acquiescing or resigning.
4. Auditors may be subjected to subtle pressure in many ways; 
the scope of their examination may be restricted more than 
is wise; the time allowed may be arbitrarily limited at the 
psychological moment; their reports may be suppressed and 
their recommendations disregarded.
These situations, even when they do not create definite open 
issues, can do much to undermine the auditors’ feeling of inde­
pendence and prevent his convictions from showing teeth. Un­
consciously he may seek ways of meeting concrete situations 
without realizing that, while constituting technical “disclosure,” 
his phrases may nevertheless fail to carry the necessary message 
to the reader. He is constrained, perhaps, to qualify his certi­
ficate. But that device may give the average reader the im­
pression that the auditor was merely dodging responsibility, or 
it may fail utterly because of its cautious phrasing to accomplish 
its purpose of putting the investor “on notice.”
This is no indictment of public accountants; no other equal 
group of men in contact with affairs will assay a higher average of 
disinterestedness and impartiality. Certified public accountants 
have made an enviable record of high-minded, expert service and 
many individual accountants have repeatedly demonstrated 
that they set their convictions above fees. Yet the fact remains 
that the conditions under which they perform their critical and 
quasi-judicial function constitute a definite culture-medium in 
which the germs of professional weakness can and sometimes do 
grow. The principal issue here raised is whether a practical way 
can be found to reduce these handicaps upon a real professional 
independence and to utilize an increase of auditor independence 
for the public good.
The principal feature of the ideas outlined below is the thought 
that the federal securities act and the securities exchange act 
might be amended by congress and developed by commission regu­
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lations in a manner to confer a larger degree of real independence 
upon public accountants.
1. Corporations submitting statements under these acts could 
be required to use for that purpose only statements prepared and 
certified by auditors who shall have been licensed under the 
securities and exchange commission; they could be required in 
general to facilitate the auditor’s work and specifically to keep 
him advised concerning proposed changes in financial structure or 
other major financial adjustments; they should be prevented from 
taking the initiative in terminating the professional services of their 
licensed auditor unless by authority of a board of financial review 
after a full hearing; they should be required to submit disputes 
with the auditor to arbitration by the board of financial review.
2. Auditors who desire to qualify for practice under these stat­
utes could be required to register with the commission and re­
ceive a licence. The basic requirements for obtaining a licence 
should be:
a. The applicant must be professionally qualified for this type 
of engagement as indicated by his education, experience, 
state certificate and professional connections.
b. The applicant must have membership in a professional body 
having professional qualifications for admission and dis­
ciplinary powers over the members.
c. The applicant must make public acknowledgment, by oath 
or otherwise, of his acceptance of the responsibilities resting 
upon an auditor to disclose the full facts clearly and to ex­
press his professional opinion fearlessly in behalf of all 
parties at interest. The phrase “parties at interest” is to 
mean potential or present investors of every grade or contrac­
tual relationship.
Employees of auditing firms, if given substantial discretion in the 
conduct of professional engagements under these statutes, must 
be licensed auditors.
3. Licensed auditors’ duties should be made broader than those 
of the usual audit and should be outlined in general terms by 
commission regulations under the statute. Briefly these duties 
would be to examine and disclose. Examination would call for 
the following:
a. Examination of the corporate records and accounts to see 
that the results of the transactions reflect the principles of 
good accounting.
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b. Scrutiny of security contracts, of proposals to change the 
financial structure and of financial valuations or operations 
to see that the principles of sound finance were not being 
violated and that the interest of no class of security holder 
was (accidentally or by design) being undermined without 
the latter’s knowledge of the real significance of the situation.
c. Follow up the accounting of new financing to see if the use 
made of the funds was as stated in the prospectus.
Disclosure would call for the following:
a. Presentation and certification of a full, clear statement of 
present financial condition, including a careful indication of 
the types of security contracts outstanding.
b. Presentation of full, clear statements of income for the cur­
rent fiscal period, as well as an analysis of past surplus, 
and a certification of the earned income of the past three 
years.
These responsibilities laid upon the auditor would place his trained 
judgment and skill as an analyst at the disposal, as it were, of the 
whole investing public. The right of appeal by either party of 
unsettled issues between auditor and client to the board of 
financial review for arbitration would further assure the public 
of sound practices.
4. As a judicial adjunct to the security and exchange commis­
sion a board of financial review should be formed to serve as a 
court of arbitration of such disagreements as may arise between 
licensed auditors and their clients. Disputes may arise over ques­
tions of
a. Good accounting theory or sound financial principles.
b. Neglect by the auditor of professional duty.
c. Need for a change of auditors.
d. Adequacy of service or fee.
The members of such a court should be appointed for a long term 
of service by the president of the United States from a list of men 
whom the accountants’ national organizations (American Institute 
of Accountants, American Society of Certified Public Account­
ants, National Association of Cost Accountants, American Asso­
ciation of University Instructors in Accounting) would nominate 
as particularly well qualified for this type of governmental 
service. Obviously such a list should be made up of the best that 
the accountancy profession could produce of broad education, 
varied experience and judicial temperament.
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A group of interested, earnest specialists in accounting, such as 
would be chosen for this court, would build up in a relatively short 
time a most useful body of sound and authoritative precedents 
related to specific situations. This would afford an exceptional 
basis for shaping that body of doctrine called principles of good 
accounting and sound finance into a well coordinated form, so 
needed by practitioners in the field as guides in their current work 
and by students in the class room in preparation for their future 
work.
In order to assure wholly disinterested and fearless judgments, 
the members of the court should receive a generous salary during 
their term of service and every member not reappointed should get 
a substantial pension upon retirement. This would give every 
person entering this new responsibility the same economic and 
intellectual independence as a life appointment.
5. Auditors who are protected in their professional independ­
ence, when they are conscientious in their duties and correct in 
their principles, should willingly accept definite and positive 
liabilities to be applied when they become derelict as auditors.
a. Neglect of professional duty should, after a hearing before 
the board of financial review, result in suspension of licence 
of the individual accountants directly responsible and loss of 
the client if the fault be decided to be minor neglect, and 
permanent loss of licence if the decision was major neglect.
b. Anyone convicted before the board of financial review of 
neglect of the duties of auditors, which are customary in the 
circumstances of that case, who loses his licence as a result, 
may not practise for himself under these acts or serve as a 
responsible supervisor on the staff of an accountant who 
does so practise.
c. If a hearing before the board of financial review should dis­
close a presumption of connivance by the auditor in the issu­
ance of a false financial statement or in concealing fraud in 
the accounts, the statute should make the auditor civilly 
and criminally liable to the client and to third parties who 
could prove they had relied upon the false statements.
The time is past when it is proper to divide those who supply the 
capital for modern corporations into two opposite categories: 
owners and lenders. All investors, not excluding open trade 
creditors, are contractual creditors of the corporation and differ 
one from the other only by the terms of their respective contracts. 
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Under a simpler financial structure, where practically all capital 
came from common stockholders, the directors in effect repre­
sented all sources of capital. The problem of finding a way to 
select directors who can truly be called representatives of all 
suppliers of capital is still unsolved, and until it is solved the early 
ideal of the British plan of two counter-poised representatives 
can not be fully achieved for our modern corporations. But the 
above outline suggests that a way could be found to bring the 
auditor-half of the plan into a close approximation of the ideal of 
a really independent critic “in the interest of all who supply cap­
ital.” If that independence were made possible, surely it would 
be quite generally acknowledged a better method of increasing 
investor protection than either dependence upon auditors subject 
to dismissal by the persons under scrutiny or upon an inadequate 
number of auditors attached to a federal bureau as bank examin­
ers now are.
The plan outlined is a middle course resting upon a foundation 
already available. And it is a plan which should not be difficult 
to put into operation. In essence it would provide first, a system 
of quasi-judicial scrutiny—by men trained under exacting pro­
fessional standards—of corporate transactions and proposals, to 
the end that brakes may be applied to unsound practices still in 
the making, and, second, a method for a considered review of dis­
puted questions and a suitable discipline for unprofessional or im­
proper conduct.
This proposal would elevate public accountants to a larger 
responsibility. But it is not advanced for their sake. It is sug­
gested in the conviction that public accountants would be able to 
make a real contribution to the problem of protecting investors 
from deceit. Even hedged about as they now are by subtle 
factors tending to undermine their full freedom of opinion, public 
accountants still are more unprejudiced in their views than the 
management which plans an issue of new securities, more unbiased 
than the underwriters who expect to sell the issue to others at a 
profit to themselves, and more public-minded than the attorney 
who draws a security contract with a keen sense of the best inter­
ests of the “insiders.”
A real independence for the auditor is as necessary to the ful­
fillment of his function as an unofficial representative of the 
investing public as the recognition of privileged communications 
is to the fulfillment of the lawyers’ function. Indeed it is the 
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public accountants’ already well-developed sense of professional 
independence that qualifies them for an increased real independ­
ence as quasi-public representatives of the interests of inarticulate 
and scattered investors. They are in fact professional men who 
already are well suited to “ . . . protect those whom they serve 
against spoliation.” But they need better public support in their 
task.
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